When Is Inductive Inference Possible? (2312.00170v2)

Abstract: Can a physicist make only a finite number of errors in the eternal quest to uncover the law of nature? This millennium-old philosophical problem, known as inductive inference, lies at the heart of epistemology. Despite its significance to understanding human reasoning, a rigorous justification of inductive inference has remained elusive. At a high level, inductive inference asks whether one can make at most finite errors amidst an infinite sequence of observations, when deducing the correct hypothesis from a given hypothesis class. Historically, the only theoretical guarantee has been that if the hypothesis class is countable, inductive inference is possible, as exemplified by Solomonoff induction for learning Turing machines. In this paper, we provide a tight characterization of inductive inference by establishing a novel link to online learning theory. As our main result, we prove that inductive inference is possible if and only if the hypothesis class is a countable union of online learnable classes, potentially with an uncountable size, no matter the observations are adaptively chosen or iid sampled. Moreover, the same condition is also sufficient and necessary in the agnostic setting, where any hypothesis class meeting this criterion enjoys an $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret bound for any time step $T$, while others require an arbitrarily slow rate of regret. Our main technical tool is a novel non-uniform online learning framework, which may be of independent interest.