The inversion paradox, and classification of fairness notions (2311.16770v2)

Abstract: Several different fairness notions have been introduced in the context of fair allocation of goods. In this manuscript, we compare between some fairness notions that are used in settings in which agents have arbitrary (perhaps unequal) entitlements to the goods. This includes the proportional share, the anyprice share, the weighted maximin share, weighted envy freeness, maximum weight Nash social welfare and competitive equilibrium. We perform this comparison in two settings, that of a divisible homogeneous good and arbitrary valuations, and that of indivisible goods and additive valuations. Different fairness notions are not always compatible with each other, and might dictate selecting different allocations. The purpose of our work is to clarify various properties of fairness notions, so as to allow, when needed, to make an educated choice among them. Also, such a study may motivate introducing new fairness notions, or modifications to existing fairness notions. Among other properties, we introduce definitions for monotonicity that postulate that having higher entitlement should be better to the agent than having lower entitlement. Some monotonicity notions, such as population monotonicity and weight monotonicity, appeared in previous work, but we prefer to consider other monotonicity properties that we refer to as global monotonicity and individual monotonicity. We find that some of the fairness notions (but not all) violate our monotonicity properties in a strong sense, that we refer to as the inversion paradox. Under this paradox, a fairness notion enforces that the value received by an agent decreases when the entitlement of the agent increases.