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Evolutionary game theory: the mathematics of evolution and collective behaviours (2311.14480v1)

Published 24 Nov 2023 in cs.MA, cs.AI, math-ph, math.DS, math.MP, and nlin.AO

Abstract: This brief discusses evolutionary game theory as a powerful and unified mathematical tool to study evolution of collective behaviours. It summarises some of my recent research directions using evolutionary game theory methods, which include i) the analysis of statistical properties of the number of (stable) equilibria in a random evolutionary game, and ii) the modelling of safety behaviours' evolution and the risk posed by advanced Artificial Intelligence technologies in a technology development race. Finally, it includes an outlook and some suggestions for future researchers.

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Authors (1)
  1. The Anh Han (44 papers)