Evolutionary game selection creates cooperative environments (2311.11128v2)

Abstract: The emergence of collective cooperation in competitive environments is a well-known phenomenon in biology, economics, and social systems. While most evolutionary game models focus on the evolution of strategies for a fixed game, how strategic decisions coevolve with the environment has so far mostly been overlooked. Here, we consider a game selection model where not only the strategies but also the game can change over time following evolutionary principles. Our results show that coevolutionary dynamics of games and strategies can induce novel collective phenomena, fostering the emergence of cooperative environments. When the model is taken on structured populations the architecture of the interaction network can significantly amplify pro-social behavior, with a critical role played by network heterogeneity and the presence of clustered groups of similar players, distinctive features observed in real-world populations. By unveiling the link between the evolution of strategies and games for different structured populations, our model sheds new light on the origin of social dilemmas ubiquitously observed in real-world social systems.

The paper "Evolutionary game selection creates cooperative environments" explores the interplay between strategic decision-making and environmental changes within the framework of evolutionary game theory. Traditionally, evolutionary game models have emphasized the evolution of strategies within a static game. However, this paper innovates by allowing both strategies and the game itself to evolve over time, driven by evolutionary principles.

The research highlights several key findings:

1. Co-evolutionary Dynamics: By introducing a model where games and strategies co-evolve, the paper demonstrates that novel collective phenomena can arise, facilitating the emergence of cooperative environments. This dynamic interaction can produce environments that inherently support cooperative behavior.
2. Structured Populations: The paper examines how structured populations—populations with inherent interaction patterns or networks—can influence the evolution of cooperation. The architecture of these interaction networks plays a significant role in promoting prosocial behavior.
3. Network Heterogeneity and Clusters: The presence of network heterogeneity and clustered groups within these structured populations is crucial. Such features are common in real-world social systems and significantly contribute to amplifying cooperative behavior.
4. Social Dilemmas: By linking the evolution of strategies to the evolution of games across different structured populations, this model provides insights into the origins of social dilemmas prevalent in real-world social systems. The dynamics explored in the paper help explain why such dilemmas persist and how cooperation might emerge in competitive settings.

Overall, the paper contributes to our understanding of how cooperative environments can evolve and thrive through the co-evolution of strategies and games, emphasizing the importance of network structure and diversity in promoting cooperation.