Simulator-Driven Deceptive Control via Path Integral Approach (2308.14092v1)

Abstract: We consider a setting where a supervisor delegates an agent to perform a certain control task, while the agent is incentivized to deviate from the given policy to achieve its own goal. In this work, we synthesize the optimal deceptive policies for an agent who attempts to hide its deviations from the supervisor's policy. We study the deception problem in the continuous-state discrete-time stochastic dynamics setting and, using motivations from hypothesis testing theory, formulate a Kullback-Leibler control problem for the synthesis of deceptive policies. This problem can be solved using backward dynamic programming in principle, which suffers from the curse of dimensionality. However, under the assumption of deterministic state dynamics, we show that the optimal deceptive actions can be generated using path integral control. This allows the agent to numerically compute the deceptive actions via Monte Carlo simulations. Since Monte Carlo simulations can be efficiently parallelized, our approach allows the agent to generate deceptive control actions online. We show that the proposed simulation-driven control approach asymptotically converges to the optimal control distribution.