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FP-Rowhammer: DRAM-Based Device Fingerprinting (2307.00143v2)

Published 30 Jun 2023 in cs.CR

Abstract: Device fingerprinting leverages attributes that capture heterogeneity in hardware and software configurations to extract unique and stable fingerprints. Fingerprinting countermeasures attempt to either present a uniform fingerprint across different devices through normalization or present different fingerprints for the same device each time through obfuscation. We present FP-Rowhammer, a Rowhammer-based device fingerprinting approach that can build unique and stable fingerprints even across devices with normalized or obfuscated hardware and software configurations. To this end, FP-Rowhammer leverages the DRAM manufacturing process variation that gives rise to unique distributions of Rowhammer-induced bit flips across different DRAM modules. Our evaluation on a test bed of 98 DRAM modules shows that FP-Rowhammer achieves 99.91% fingerprinting accuracy. FP-Rowhammer's fingerprints are also stable, with no degradation in fingerprinting accuracy over a period of ten days. We also demonstrate that FP-Rowhammer is efficient, taking less than five seconds to extract a fingerprint. FP-Rowhammer is the first Rowhammer fingerprinting approach that is able to extract unique and stable fingerprints efficiently and at scale.

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Authors (6)
  1. Hari Venugopalan (4 papers)
  2. Kaustav Goswami (4 papers)
  3. Zainul Abi Din (3 papers)
  4. Jason Lowe-Power (11 papers)
  5. Samuel T. King (6 papers)
  6. Zubair Shafiq (43 papers)
Citations (3)

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