A Highly Accurate Query-Recovery Attack against Searchable Encryption using Non-Indexed Documents (2306.15302v1)

Abstract: Cloud data storage solutions offer customers cost-effective and reduced data management. While attractive, data security issues remain to be a core concern. Traditional encryption protects stored documents, but hinders simple functionalities such as keyword search. Therefore, searchable encryption schemes have been proposed to allow for the search on encrypted data. Efficient schemes leak at least the access pattern (the accessed documents per keyword search), which is known to be exploitable in query recovery attacks assuming the attacker has a significant amount of background knowledge on the stored documents. Existing attacks can only achieve decent results with strong adversary models (e.g. at least 20% of previously known documents or require additional knowledge such as on query frequencies) and they give no metric to evaluate the certainty of recovered queries. This hampers their practical utility and questions their relevance in the real-world. We propose a refined score attack which achieves query recovery rates of around 85% without requiring exact background knowledge on stored documents; a distributionally similar, but otherwise different (i.e., non-indexed), dataset suffices. The attack starts with very few known queries (around 10 known queries in our experiments over different datasets of varying size) and then iteratively recovers further queries with confidence scores by adding previously recovered queries that had high confidence scores to the set of known queries. Additional to high recovery rates, our approach yields interpretable results in terms of confidence scores.