Citadel: Real-World Hardware-Software Contracts for Secure Enclaves Through Microarchitectural Isolation and Controlled Speculation (2306.14882v4)

Abstract: Hardware isolation primitives such as secure enclaves aim to protect sensitive programs, but remain vulnerable to transient execution attacks. Complete microarchitectural isolation is not a satisfactory defense mechanism as it leaves out public shared memory, critical for usability and application performance. Conversely, hardware-software co-designs for secure speculation can counter these attacks but are not yet practical, since they make assumptions on the speculation modes, the exposed microarchitectural state, and the software, which are all hard to support for the entire software stack. This paper advocates for processors to incorporate microarchitectural isolation primitives and mechanisms for controlled speculation, enabling different execution modes. These modes can restrict what is exposed to an attacker, effectively balancing performance and program-analysis complexity. We introduce two mechanisms to securely share memory between an enclave and an untrusted OS in an out-of-order processor. We show that our two modes are complementary, achieving speculative non-interference with a reasonable performance impact, while requiring minimal code annotation and simple program analysis doable by hand. Our prototype, Citadel, is a multicore processor running on an FPGA, booting untrusted Linux, and supporting comprehensive enclave capabilities, such as shared memory, and remote attestation. To our knowledge, Citadel is the first end-to-end enclave platform to run secure applications, such as cryptographic libraries or small private inference workloads, on a speculative out-of-order multicore processor while protecting against a significant class of side-channel attacks.