Towards a Switching-Algebraic Theory of Weighted Voting Systems: Exploring Restrictions on Coalition Formation (2306.13684v1)

Abstract: We explore the switching-algebraic computation of the Banzhaf indices for general and monotone or unrestricted systems. This computation is achieved via (a) two Boolean-quotient formulas that are valid when the voting system is not necessarily monotone (e.g., when coalition formation is restricted), (b) four Boolean differencing formulas and six Boolean-quotient formulas that are applicable when the decision switching function is a positively polarized unate one. We also provide switching-algebraic formulas for certain Banzhaf-related indices, including the power-to-initiate index (PII), and the power-to-prevent index (PPI), as well as satisfaction indices. Moreover, we briefly address other Banzhaf-related indices, including the Strict Power Index (SPI) and the Public Good Index (PGI). We illustrate the various indices formulas by way of four examples of voting systems, each considered first as an unrestricted monotone system and then subjected to a restriction on the formation of a coalition between two particular voters.