A semantic backdoor attack against Graph Convolutional Networks (2302.14353v4)

Abstract: Graph convolutional networks (GCNs) have been very effective in addressing the issue of various graph-structured related tasks. However, recent research has shown that GCNs are vulnerable to a new type of threat called a backdoor attack, where the adversary can inject a hidden backdoor into GCNs so that the attacked model performs well on benign samples, but its prediction will be maliciously changed to the attacker-specified target label if the hidden backdoor is activated by the attacker-defined trigger. A semantic backdoor attack is a new type of backdoor attack on deep neural networks (DNNs), where a naturally occurring semantic feature of samples can serve as a backdoor trigger such that the infected DNN models will misclassify testing samples containing the predefined semantic feature even without the requirement of modifying the testing samples. Since the backdoor trigger is a naturally occurring semantic feature of the samples, semantic backdoor attacks are more imperceptible and pose a new and serious threat. In this paper, we investigate whether such semantic backdoor attacks are possible for GCNs and propose a semantic backdoor attack against GCNs (SBAG) under the context of graph classification to reveal the existence of this security vulnerability in GCNs. SBAG uses a certain type of node in the samples as a backdoor trigger and injects a hidden backdoor into GCN models by poisoning training data. The backdoor will be activated, and the GCN models will give malicious classification results specified by the attacker even on unmodified samples as long as the samples contain enough trigger nodes. We evaluate SBAG on four graph datasets and the experimental results indicate that SBAG is effective.