Towards Understanding and Boosting Adversarial Transferability from a Distribution Perspective (2210.04213v1)

Abstract: Transferable adversarial attacks against Deep neural networks (DNNs) have received broad attention in recent years. An adversarial example can be crafted by a surrogate model and then attack the unknown target model successfully, which brings a severe threat to DNNs. The exact underlying reasons for the transferability are still not completely understood. Previous work mostly explores the causes from the model perspective, e.g., decision boundary, model architecture, and model capacity. adversarial attacks against Deep neural networks (DNNs) have received broad attention in recent years. An adversarial example can be crafted by a surrogate model and then attack the unknown target model successfully, which brings a severe threat to DNNs. The exact underlying reasons for the transferability are still not completely understood. Previous work mostly explores the causes from the model perspective. Here, we investigate the transferability from the data distribution perspective and hypothesize that pushing the image away from its original distribution can enhance the adversarial transferability. To be specific, moving the image out of its original distribution makes different models hardly classify the image correctly, which benefits the untargeted attack, and dragging the image into the target distribution misleads the models to classify the image as the target class, which benefits the targeted attack. Towards this end, we propose a novel method that crafts adversarial examples by manipulating the distribution of the image. We conduct comprehensive transferable attacks against multiple DNNs to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method. Our method can significantly improve the transferability of the crafted attacks and achieves state-of-the-art performance in both untargeted and targeted scenarios, surpassing the previous best method by up to 40$\%$ in some cases.