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A Sealed-bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage (2207.10823v2)

Published 22 Jul 2022 in cs.CR and cs.GT

Abstract: In an open-bid auction, a bidder can know the budgets of other bidders. Thus, a sealed-bid auction that hides bidding prices is desirable. However, in previous sealed-bid auction protocols, it has been difficult to provide a ``fund binding'' property, which would guarantee that a bidder has funds more than or equal to the bidding price and that the funds are forcibly withdrawn when the bidder wins. Thus, such protocols are vulnerable to false bidding. As a solution, many protocols employ a simple deposit method in which each bidder sends a deposit to a smart contract, which is greater than or equal to the bidding price, before the bidding phase. However, this deposit reveals the maximum bidding price, and it is preferable to hide this information. In this paper, we propose a sealed-bid auction protocol that provides a fund binding property. Our protocol not only hides the bidding price and a maximum bidding price, but also provides fund binding, simultaneously. For hiding the maximum bidding price, we pay attention to the fact that usual Ethereum transactions and transactions for sending funds to a one-time address have the same transaction structure, and it seems that they are indistinguishable. We discuss how much bidding transactions are hidden. We also employ DECO (Zhang et al,. CCS 2020) that proves the validity of the data to a verifier in which the data are taken from a source without showing the data itself. Finally, we give our implementation which shows transaction fees required and compare it to a sealed-bid auction protocol employing the simple deposit method.

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