A Survey of Graph-Theoretic Approaches for Analyzing the Resilience of Networked Control Systems

Abstract: As the scale of networked control systems increases and interactions between different subsystems become more sophisticated, questions of the resilience of such networks increase in importance. The need to redefine classical system and control-theoretic notions using the language of graphs has recently started to gain attention as a fertile and important area of research. This paper presents an overview of graph-theoretic methods for analyzing the resilience of networked control systems. We discuss various distributed algorithms operating on networked systems and investigate their resilience against adversarial actions by looking at the structural properties of their underlying networks. We present graph-theoretic methods to quantify the attack impact, and reinterpret some system-theoretic notions of robustness from a graph-theoretic standpoint to mitigate the impact of the attacks. Moreover, we discuss miscellaneous problems in the security of networked control systems which use graph-theory as a tool in their analyses. We conclude by introducing some avenues for further research in this field.