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Empirical Analysis of EIP-1559: Transaction Fees, Waiting Time, and Consensus Security (2201.05574v4)

Published 14 Jan 2022 in econ.GN, cs.CR, cs.DC, cs.GT, and q-fin.EC

Abstract: A transaction fee mechanism (TFM) is an essential component of a blockchain protocol. However, a systematic evaluation of the real-world impact of TFMs is still absent. Using rich data from the Ethereum blockchain, the mempool, and exchanges, we study the effect of EIP-1559, one of the earliest-deployed TFMs that depart from the traditional first-price auction paradigm. We conduct a rigorous and comprehensive empirical study to examine its causal effect on blockchain transaction fee dynamics, transaction waiting times, and consensus security. Our results show that EIP-1559 improves the user experience by mitigating intrablock differences in the gas price paid and reducing users' waiting times. However, EIP-1559 has only a small effect on gas fee levels and consensus security. In addition, we find that when Ether's price is more volatile, the waiting time is significantly higher. We also verify that a larger block size increases the presence of siblings. These findings suggest new directions for improving TFMs.

Citations (74)

Summary

  • The paper demonstrates that EIP-1559 enhances fee estimation and reduces waiting times, streamlining user transactions.
  • Using diverse blockchain datasets, the study reveals that users employing the EIP-1559 bidding approach generally incur lower fees with more predictable gas prices.
  • The analysis identifies a slight increase in fork rates and Miner Extractable Value, subtly impacting consensus security while keeping network stability intact.

Empirical Analysis of EIP-1559: Transaction Fees, Waiting Time, and Consensus Security

The implementation of the Ethereum Improvement Proposal (EIP) 1559 represents a significant shift away from the traditional first-price auction model used for transaction fees in Ethereum and other major blockchains. This research paper systematically examines the empirical effects that EIP-1559 has on Ethereum's transaction fee dynamics, waiting times, and overall consensus security. Using diverse datasets from Ethereum's blockchain, mempool, and exchanges, the paper provides a detailed analysis of these aspects post-EIP-1559 implementation.

Transaction Fee Dynamics

The research finds that while EIP-1559 does not significantly lower the overall level of transaction fees, it streamlines the fee estimation process for users. This is achieved by introducing a base fee and allowing for simpler bidding strategies within the framework of max fees and priority fees. The paper demonstrates that users employing the EIP-1559 bidding style generally pay lower fees than those sticking with the legacy bidding method. Moreover, the analysis indicates a reduction in intra-block differences of gas prices, which reflects easier and more predictable fee estimation, improving the transaction experience.

Transaction Waiting Time

The paper observes that EIP-1559 contributes to reduced waiting times for transactions. The waiting time, defined as the delay between a transaction first appearing in the mempool and its eventual inclusion in a block, shows a noticeable decrease post-implementation. This is likely due to more predictable transaction fees and the impact of dynamically adjustable block sizes that the EIP-1559 model introduces. As a result, user experience in terms of transaction speed has been enhanced.

Consensus Security and Network Load

The implications of EIP-1559 on consensus security are complex and not wholly resolved in this paper. The research shows that the implementation slightly increases the fork rate due to larger average block sizes, although this effect is not substantial enough to raise significant concerns about consensus stability. Additionally, challenges related to the network load appear to be manageable, with no significant long-term changes observed in load spikes before and after the implementation.

An important observation made by the paper is the rising share of Miner Extractable Value (MEV) in miners' revenue post-EIP-1559. As a consequence, miners might have increased incentives for MEV extraction, which could introduce risks to consensus security under certain conditions.

Implications and Future Directions

The paper’s findings primarily indicate that the EIP-1559 successfully tackles the inefficiencies of the previous fee mechanism by making fee estimations more straightforward and by improving transaction times. However, the model does not drastically reduce average fee levels.

Looking forward, interesting areas for continued exploration include assessing the long-term effects of dynamic block sizes on network performance and security, notably in relation to fork occurrences. Additionally, investigating the broader implications of increased MEV could provide insights into potential security risks and inform future design choices for transaction fee mechanisms.

This research deepens our empirical understanding of transaction fee mechanisms in blockchain ecosystems, with potential applications not only in Ethereum but also in other platforms aiming to refine their transaction models. The insights may guide blockchain architects in developing fee mechanisms that are both user-friendly and secure, meeting evolving demands in decentralized network environments.