DeepSteal: Advanced Model Extractions Leveraging Efficient Weight Stealing in Memories (2111.04625v1)

Abstract: Recent advancements of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have seen widespread deployment in multiple security-sensitive domains. The need of resource-intensive training and use of valuable domain-specific training data have made these models a top intellectual property (IP) for model owners. One of the major threats to the DNN privacy is model extraction attacks where adversaries attempt to steal sensitive information in DNN models. Recent studies show hardware-based side channel attacks can reveal internal knowledge about DNN models (e.g., model architectures) However, to date, existing attacks cannot extract detailed model parameters (e.g., weights/biases). In this work, for the first time, we propose an advanced model extraction attack framework DeepSteal that effectively steals DNN weights with the aid of memory side-channel attack. Our proposed DeepSteal comprises two key stages. Firstly, we develop a new weight bit information extraction method, called HammerLeak, through adopting the rowhammer based hardware fault technique as the information leakage vector. HammerLeak leverages several novel system-level techniques tailed for DNN applications to enable fast and efficient weight stealing. Secondly, we propose a novel substitute model training algorithm with Mean Clustering weight penalty, which leverages the partial leaked bit information effectively and generates a substitute prototype of the target victim model. We evaluate this substitute model extraction method on three popular image datasets (e.g., CIFAR-10/100/GTSRB) and four DNN architectures (e.g., ResNet-18/34/Wide-ResNet/VGG-11). The extracted substitute model has successfully achieved more than 90 % test accuracy on deep residual networks for the CIFAR-10 dataset. Moreover, our extracted substitute model could also generate effective adversarial input samples to fool the victim model.