Introducing Fast and Secure Deterministic Stash Free Write Only Oblivious RAMs for Demand Paging in Keystone (2106.09966v1)

Abstract: Keystone is a trusted execution environment, based on RISC-V architecture. It divides the memory into a secure Keystone private memory and an unsecure non-Keystone memory, and allows code that lies inside the Keystone private memory to execute securely. Simple demand paging in Keystone ends up leaking sensitive access patterns of Keystone application to the Operating System(OS), that is assumed to be malicious. This is because, to access the unsecure non-Keystone memory, Keystone needs support of the OS. To mitigate this, Keystone needs to implement oblivious demand paging while obfuscating its page access patterns by using Oblivious RAM(ORAM) techniques. This causes substantial slowdown in the application execution. In this paper, we bridge the performance gap between application execution time with unsecure and secure demand paging in Keystone by using Deterministic, stash free, Write only ORAM (DetWoORAM) for oblivious demand paging. We also show why DetWoORAM, that is a write-only ORAM, is sufficient for oblivious demand paging. DetWoORAM logically partitions the memory into a main area and a holding area. The actual pages are stored in main area. We propose two enhancements over DetWoORAM that improves the application execution slowdown. The first enhancement, which we call the Eager DetWoORAM, involves page preloading that exploits the deterministic access pattern of DetWoORAM, and tries to hide the ORAM latency. The second enhancement, which we call the Parallel DetWoORAM, involves spawning multiple threads and each thread performs a part of the DetWoORAM memory access algorithm. Compared to DetWoORAM that shows slowdown of [1.4x, 2x, and 3.24x], Eager DetWoORAM and Parallel DetWoORAM provide slowdown of [1.2x, 1.8x, and 3.2x] and [1.1x, 1.1x, and 1.4x], for k= 3, 7, and 15, respectively.