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The Availability-Accountability Dilemma and its Resolution via Accountability Gadgets (2105.06075v3)

Published 13 May 2021 in cs.CR and cs.DC

Abstract: For applications of Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) consensus protocols where the participants are economic agents, recent works highlighted the importance of accountability: the ability to identify participants who provably violate the protocol. At the same time, being able to reach consensus under dynamic levels of participation is desirable for censorship resistance. We identify an availability-accountability dilemma: in an environment with dynamic participation, no protocol can simultaneously be accountably-safe and live. We provide a resolution to this dilemma by constructing a provably secure optimally-resilient accountability gadget to checkpoint a longest chain protocol, such that the full ledger is live under dynamic participation and the checkpointed prefix ledger is accountable. Our accountability gadget construction is black-box and can use any BFT protocol which is accountable under static participation. Using HotStuff as the black box, we implemented our construction as a protocol for the Ethereum 2.0 beacon chain, and our Internet-scale experiments with more than 4000 nodes show that the protocol achieves the required scalability and has better latency than the current solution Gasper, which was shown insecure by recent attacks.

Citations (35)

Summary

  • The paper identifies the availability-accountability dilemma in Byzantine fault tolerant protocols and proposes accountability gadgets as a resolution.
  • Accountability gadgets partition roles to secure accountable checkpoints while maintaining ledger availability, resolving the trade-off in dynamic network settings.
  • Practical experiments demonstrate the gadget's scalability and superior latency compared to existing solutions like Ethereum 2.0's Gasper protocol, enhancing BFT security.

An Insight into Availability-Accountability Dilemma and Accountability Gadgets

The research paper titled "The Availability-Accountability Dilemma and its Resolution via Accountability Gadgets" authored by Joachim Neu, Ertem Nusret Tas, and David Tse provides a comprehensive examination of Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) consensus protocols in the context of decentralized applications, highlighting a critical trade-off between availability and accountability. This paper meticulously outlines the availability-accountability dilemma in consensus protocols and offers a robust framework to address these challenges through accountability gadgets.

The authors investigate dynamic participation within Byzantine fault tolerance, drawing attention to the inherent inability of protocols to sustain both accountability and liveness under dynamic settings. The paper defines accountability as the capacity of protocols to identify non-compliant participants effectively. A significant contribution is the formal identification and proof of the availability-accountability dilemma, asserting that it is impossible for a protocol to simultaneously achieve high levels of both accountable safety and liveness in a dynamic environment—specifically under network modes where participation fluctuates significantly.

Furthermore, the authors propose a solution to this dilemma through the development of accountability gadgets. This novel construct serves to partition the roles of maintaining a live ledger and securing accountable checkpoints. The accountability gadget operates alongside a longest chain protocol, which ensures full ledger availability even when participation is dynamic. Simultaneously, it establishes a checkpointed prefix ledger reinforced by stricter accountability measures for safety.

The practical significance of this protocol implementation is evidenced through their Internet-scale experiments involving over 4,000 nodes, demonstrating the accountability gadget's scalability and superior latency in comparison to existing solutions such as Ethereum 2.0's Gasper protocol, which faced security inadequacies in prior attacks. Indeed, achieving both optimal security and accountability appears feasible within this framework, marking a notable advancement for economic agents leveraging BFT protocols.

On a theoretical level, the paper enhances the understanding of fundamental trade-offs in BFT scenarios by extending the resilience metric to encompass both liveness and accountability safety, introducing a fresh paradigm into consensus protocol analysis. Additionally, the construction's compatibility with multiple underlying protocols as black-box components allows for greater flexibility and adaptability.

Looking to the future, the incorporation of accountability mechanisms in decentralized environments holds profound implications for the development and security of blockchain applications. By addressing the challenge of dynamic participation, this research not only fortifies the theoretical foundations of distributed systems but also lays down the groundwork for improved security architectures in decentralized economic systems.

In conclusion, the research advances the discourse on consensus protocols by elegantly tailoring accountability mechanisms to fit within dynamic networking constraints, thereby aligning both security and economic incentives. This approach signifies a meaningful stride towards achieving resilient, accountable, and efficient systems in an era of evolving decentralized technologies.

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