Volcano: Stateless Cache Side-channel Attack by Exploiting Mesh Interconnect (2103.04533v1)

Abstract: Cache side-channel attacks lead to severe security threats to the settings that a CPU is shared across users, e.g., in the cloud. The existing attacks rely on sensing the micro-architectural state changes made by victims, and this assumption can be invalidated by combining spatial (\eg, Intel CAT) and temporal isolation (\eg, time protection). In this work, we advance the state of cache side-channel attacks by showing stateless cache side-channel attacks that cannot be defeated by both spatial and temporal isolation. This side-channel exploits the timing difference resulted from interconnect congestion. Specifically, to complete cache transactions, for Intel CPUs, cache lines would travel across cores via the CPU mesh interconnect. Nonetheless, the mesh links are shared by all cores, and cache isolation does not segregate the traffic. An attacker can generate interconnect traffic to contend with the victim's on a mesh link, hoping that extra delay will be measured. With the variant delays, the attacker can deduce the memory access pattern of a victim program, and infer its sensitive data. Based on this idea, we implement Volcano and test it against the existing RSA implementations of JDK. We found the RSA private key used by a victim process can be partially recovered. In the end, we propose a few directions for defense and call for the attention of the security community.