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A Qualitative Theory of Cognitive Attitudes and their Change (2102.11025v1)

Published 16 Feb 2021 in cs.AI and cs.LO

Abstract: We present a general logical framework for reasoning about agents' cognitive attitudes of both epistemic type and motivational type. We show that it allows us to express a variety of relevant concepts for qualitative decision theory including the concepts of knowledge, belief, strong belief, conditional belief, desire, conditional desire, strong desire and preference. We also present two extensions of the logic, one by the notion of choice and the other by dynamic operators for belief change and desire change, and we apply the former to the analysis of single-stage games under incomplete information. We provide sound and complete axiomatizations for the basic logic and for its two extensions. The paper is under consideration in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming (TPLP).

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