Mathematical foundations of moral preferences (2101.08193v2)

Abstract: One-shot anonymous unselfishness in economic games is commonly explained by social preferences, which assume that people care about the monetary payoffs of others. However, during the last ten years, research has shown that different types of unselfish behaviour, including cooperation, altruism, truth-telling, altruistic punishment, and trustworthiness are in fact better explained by preferences for following one's own personal norms - internal standards about what is right or wrong in a given situation. Beyond better organising various forms of unselfish behaviour, this moral preference hypothesis has recently also been used to increase charitable donations, simply by means of interventions that make the morality of an action salient. Here we review experimental and theoretical work dedicated to this rapidly growing field of research, and in doing so we outline mathematical foundations for moral preferences that can be used in future models to better understand selfless human actions and to adjust policies accordingly. These foundations can also be used by artificial intelligence to better navigate the complex landscape of human morality.

• The paper introduces a moral preferences framework that challenges traditional social preference models in economic decision-making.
• It employs experimental analysis using games like the ultimatum, dictator, and sender-receiver to demonstrate that personal norms drive behavior.
• The findings suggest revising utility functions to incorporate moral components, with implications for policy interventions and AI design.

Mathematical Foundations of Moral Preferences: A Critical Evaluation

The paper "Mathematical Foundations of Moral Preferences" by Valerio Capraro and Matjaž Perc provides a comprehensive examination of the moral preferences hypothesis, challenging traditional models of social preferences in explaining human unselfish behavior in economic games. By stepping away from a purely monetary utilities paradigm, this manuscript contributes to evolving theoretical frameworks within behavioral economics and social psychology, proposing that personal norms significantly shape choices beyond financial implications.

Summary of Core Arguments

1. Critique of Social Preferences Models: For several decades, social preferences models have attempted to rationalize phenomena like cooperation and altruism by factoring in others’ payoffs alongside personal gains. While these models capture a wide array of social behaviors, they struggle to account for some empirical findings in experimental settings such as the ultimatum game, the dictator game, and the sender-receiver game.
2. Introduction of Moral Preferences: The research posits the existence of personal norms—internal benchmarks guiding the perception of right and wrong. According to empirical studies discussed, actions often align more with these personal norms than with economic rationality predicated on monetary outcomes or even societal expectations (injunctive norms).
3. Theoretical and Empirical Support: By elaborating on failed predictions within the existing models, the authors argue that a moral preferences framework better aligns with observed behaviors across varied contexts. For example, people opting for less financially advantageous outcomes in situations like rejecting unfair ultimatum game offers or preferring not to lie in the sender-receiver game suggest motivations extend beyond materialistic calculations.
4. Implications for Policy and AI: The paper underscores the practicalities of designing interventions that enhance pro-social behavior by accentuating personal norms. Notably, the impact on charitable motivations delineates potential strategies for deploying social nudges in real-world policy-making and artificial intelligence systems striving to emulate human moral reasoning.
5. Utility Function Modifications: As a response to the observed limitations of traditional social preference models, the authors put forth the notion of crafting utility functions inclusive of moral components tied to personal norms. The regimen shift from a focus on injunctive norms to personal norms in utility formulations emerges as a crucial contention of this work.

Experimental Evidence

The experimental methods encompass exploring various behavioral scenarios through classic economic games—dictator, prisoner’s dilemma, trust—and evaluating them through the lens of personal moral standards. The examination integrates existing studies demonstrating personal norms' precedence over injunctive or descriptive norms in specific contexts. Furthermore, the authors suggest using incentive-compatible mechanisms to probe these personal norms' influence systematically.

Future Directions

Several avenues for future research are identified, such as integrating computational linguistics and sentiment analysis to quantify action perception within a moral framework. Evolutionary game theory is also seen as fertile ground for exploring how personal norms develop and sustain across populations. Additionally, contrasting the effectiveness of personal versus social norm-based interventions in observable versus unobservable settings offers a wealth of investigational potential.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the paper by Capraro and Perc contrives a compelling narrative for re-evaluating the drivers of unselfish human actions in economic settings. It advocates that an inclusive theory embracing moral preferences could refine existing models of decision-making significantly. This exploration, which builds bridges between multiple disciplines, promises to enrich our understanding of moral psychology and aid in creating AI systems capable of exhibiting human-like moral discernment. As global complexities burgeon, understanding these nuances becomes vital in crafting policies that nurture desirable societal behaviors while acknowledging the intricate moral landscape that influences human decision-making.