Cyber Attack and Machine Induced Fault Detection and Isolation Methodologies for Cyber-Physical Systems (2009.06196v1)

Abstract: In this paper, the problem of simultaneous cyber attack and fault detection and isolation (CAFDI) in cyber-physical systems (CPS) is studied. The proposed solution methodology consists of two filters on the plant and the command and control (C&C) sides of the CPS and an unknown input observer (UIO) based detector on the plant side. Conditions under which the proposed methodology can detect deception attacks, such as covert attacks, zero dynamics attacks, and replay attacks are characterized. An advantage of the proposed methodology is that one does not require a fully secured communication link which implies that the communication link can be compromised by the adversary while it is used to transmit the C&C side observer estimates. Also, it is assumed that adversaries have access to parameters of the system, filters, and the UIO-based detector, however, they do not have access to all the communication link channels. Conditions under which, using the communication link cyber attacks, the adversary cannot eliminate the impact of actuator and sensor cyber attacks are investigated. To illustrate the capabilities and effectiveness of the proposed CAFDI methodologies, simulation case studies are provided and comparisons with detection methods that are available in the literature are included to demonstrate the advantages and benefits of our proposed solutions.