Mean Field Games of Controls: on the convergence of Nash equilibria (2006.12993v2)

Abstract: In this paper, we investigate a class of mean field games where the mean field interactions are achieved through the joint (conditional) distribution of the controlled state and the control process. The strategies are of $open\;loop$ type, and the volatility coefficient $\sigma$ can be controlled. Using (controlled) Fokker-Planck equations, we introduce a notion of measure-valued solution of mean-field games of controls, and through convergence results, prove a relation between these solutions on the one hand, and the $\epsilon_N$--Nash equilibria on the other hand. It is shown that $\epsilon_N$--Nash equilibria in the $N$--player games have limits as $N$ tends to infinity, and each limit is a measure-valued solution of the mean-field games of controls. Conversely, any measure-valued solution can be obtained as the limit of a sequence of $\epsilon_N$--Nash equilibria in the $N$--player games. In other words, the measure-valued solutions are the accumulating points of $\epsilon_N$--Nash equilibria. Similarly, by considering an $\epsilon$--strong solution of mean field games of controls which is the classical strong solution where the optimality is obtained by admitting a small error $\epsilon,$ we prove that the measure-valued solutions are the accumulating points of this type of solutions when $\epsilon$ goes to zero. Finally, existence of measure-valued solution of mean-field games of controls are proved in the case without common noise.