Rethinking network reciprocity over social ties: local interactions make direct reciprocity possible and pave the rational way to cooperation (1811.04119v1)

Abstract: Since Nowak & May's (1992) influential paper, network reciprocity--the fact that individuals' interactions repeated within a local neighborhood support the evolution of cooperation--has been confirmed in several theoretical models. Essentially, local interactions allow cooperators to stay protected from exploiters by assorting into clusters, and the heterogeneity of the network of contacts--the co-presence of low- and high-connected nodes--has been shown to further favor cooperation. The few available large-scale experiments on humans have however missed these effects. The reason is that, while models assume that individuals update strategy by imitating better performing neighbors, experiments showed that humans are more prone to reciprocate cooperation than to compare payoffs. Inspired by the empirical results, we rethink network reciprocity as a rational form of direct reciprocity on networks--networked rational reciprocity--indeed made possible by the locality of interactions. We show that reciprocal altruism in a networked prisoner's dilemma can invade and fixate in any network of rational agents, profit-maximizing over an horizon of future interactions. We find that networked rational reciprocity works better at low average connectivity and we unveil the role of network heterogeneity. Only if cooperating hubs invest in the initial cost of exploitation, the invasion of cooperation is boosted; it is otherwise hindered. Although humans might not be as rational as here assumed, our results could help the design and interpretation of new experiments in social and economic networks