Integrating Security in Resource-Constrained Cyber-Physical Systems (1811.03538v1)

Abstract: Defense mechanisms against network-level attacks are commonly based on the use of cryptographic techniques, such as message authentication codes that provide data integrity guarantees. However, such mechanisms require significant resources, which prevents their continuous use in resource-constrained cyber-physical systems. Recently, it was shown how physical properties of plants can be exploited to relax these requirements for systems where sensor measurements and actuator commands are transmitted over a compromised network; specifically, intermittent use of data authentication, can still provide Quality-of-Control (QoC) guarantees even in the presence of false-data injection attacks. Consequently, in this work we focus on integrating security into existing systems, in order to protect against these attacks. We introduce a design-time methodology that incorporates requirements for QoC in the presence of attacks into end-to-end timing constraints for real-time control transactions, which include data acquisition and authentication, communication, and control. This allows us to formulate a mixed integer linear programming-based method for synthesis of schedulable task and message parameters (i.e., deadlines and offsets) that maintain timing requirements of deployed controllers, while adding a sufficient level of protection against attacks; specifically, this method provides suitable intermittent authentication policies that ensure the desired QoC levels under attack. To additionally reduce the security-related bandwidth overhead, we propose the use of cumulative message authentication. Furthermore, we introduce a method for opportunistic use of remaining resources to further improve the overall QoC guarantees while ensuring system schedulability. Finally, we demonstrate applicability of our methodology on synthetic automotive systems as well as an automotive case-study.