Who Let The Trolls Out? Towards Understanding State-Sponsored Trolls (1811.03130v2)

Abstract: Recent evidence has emerged linking coordinated campaigns by state-sponsored actors to manipulate public opinion on the Web. Campaigns revolving around major political events are enacted via mission-focused "trolls." While trolls are involved in spreading disinformation on social media, there is little understanding of how they operate, what type of content they disseminate, how their strategies evolve over time, and how they influence the Web's information ecosystem. In this paper, we begin to address this gap by analyzing 10M posts by 5.5K Twitter and Reddit users identified as Russian and Iranian state-sponsored trolls. We compare the behavior of each group of state-sponsored trolls with a focus on how their strategies change over time, the different campaigns they embark on, and differences between the trolls operated by Russia and Iran. Among other things, we find: 1) that Russian trolls were pro-Trump while Iranian trolls were anti-Trump; 2) evidence that campaigns undertaken by such actors are influenced by real-world events; and 3) that the behavior of such actors is not consistent over time, hence automated detection is not a straightforward task. Using the Hawkes Processes statistical model, we quantify the influence these accounts have on pushing URLs on four social platforms: Twitter, Reddit, 4chan's Politically Incorrect board (/pol/), and Gab. In general, Russian trolls were more influential and efficient in pushing URLs to all the other platforms with the exception of /pol/ where Iranians were more influential. Finally, we release our data and source code to ensure the reproducibility of our results and to encourage other researchers to work on understanding other emerging kinds of state-sponsored troll accounts on Twitter.

An Analytical Study of State-Sponsored Social Media Trolls

The paper "Who Let The Trolls Out? Towards Understanding State-Sponsored Trolls" by Zannettou et al. tackles the rising phenomenon of state-sponsored actors utilizing social media to manipulate public opinion, specifically focusing on trolls identified by Twitter and Reddit. The paper provides a comprehensive analysis of 10 million posts from Russian and Iranian trolls on these platforms, focusing on their behavior, the evolution of their tactics, their targets, and the strategies they deploy in their campaigns.

The research examines these state-sponsored trolls' operations, emphasizing the distinction between Russian and Iranian executed campaigns. A key finding is the ideological divergence in their tactics: Russian trolls often demonstrated support for former President Donald Trump, whereas Iranian trolls exhibited anti-Trump sentiment. Furthermore, the paper highlights that these campaigns are frequently swayed by real-world events, adding a layer of complexity to the automated detection of such activity. For instance, Iranian campaigns targeting Saudi Arabia and France closely aligned with diplomatic tensions involving these nations.

Using Hawkes Processes, the authors assess the influence of these troll accounts across various platforms, including Twitter, Reddit, 4chan's /pol/ board, and Gab. They find that Russian trolls demonstrated greater efficiency and influence in spreading URLs across these platforms than their Iranian counterparts, with particular success on Twitter and Gab. However, interestingly, Iranian trolls exerted more influence than Russian trolls on 4chan's /pol/.

The paper also explores the troll accounts' operational aspects, such as temporal behavior. For instance, Russian troll activities on Twitter spiked during critical periods like the Ukrainian conflict and the Republican National Convention around Trump's candidacy. Similarly, Iranian trolls showed increased activity correlated with geopolitical events affecting Iran's relations with other countries.

A noteworthy contribution of the paper is the exploration of the content disseminated by these trolls. Using word embeddings and thematic analysis, the authors unravel the ideological underpinnings and strategic narratives pushed by these entities. For instance, Russian trolls were heavily involved in promoting hash tags and topics aligned with divisive political issues such as Black Lives Matter or the US-Mexico border wall, whereas Iranian trolls predominantly pushed narratives concerning conflicts in the Middle East.

The implications of the paper are multifaceted. Practically, it underscores the challenge of automating troll detection given their evolving behavior and the nuanced nature of their activities. Theoretically, it presents an opportunity for future research to further unravel the complex networks and motivations driving these state-sponsored information campaigns. As information warfare becomes increasingly prevalent in the digital age, understanding the tactics and impacts of such trolls is paramount for devising effective countermeasures and safeguarding public discourse.

In summary, Zannettou et al.'s paper provides a detailed characterization of state-sponsored trolling activities, elucidating their operational patterns, content strategies, and inter-platform influence. It serves as a crucial stepping stone for deeper investigations into combating the misinformation and disinformation propagated by such actors on social media platforms.