- The paper proposes a Canonical Coalition Game (CCG) framework where prosumers form groups for P2P energy trading, promoting cooperation and mutual benefit.
- A mid-market rate pricing mechanism is introduced, based on grid prices, which ensures coalition stability and prevents prosumers from leaving the trading group.
- Integrating rational-economic and positive reinforcement psychology models, the scheme motivates sustainable prosumer participation, achieving significant cost savings in simulations.
Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading with Sustainable User Participation: A Game Theoretic Approach
The paper "Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading with Sustainable User Participation: A Game Theoretic Approach" presents an analytical framework for peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading among prosumers within an energy network. Utilizing a canonical coalition game (CCG), the authors investigate how prosumers can form coalition groups to trade energy, thereby promoting sustainable participation in P2P energy trading. This research leverages the stability of coalition and incorporates motivational psychology models to ensure prosumer-centric trading that benefits all participants.
The proposed P2P trading scheme is designed to encourage prosumers with energy generation capabilities, such as solar photovoltaic panels, to engage in direct energy exchanges rather than relying solely on grid interactions. By forming coalitions, prosumers can optimize energy trading, ensuring that their surplus or deficit energy is traded within the network at mutually beneficial prices, thus maximizing their economic benefits.
Key Contributions and Findings
- Canonical Coalition Game (CCG) Framework:
- The paper formulates the P2P energy trading as a CCG where prosumers participate in coalitions, leading to energy trading grounded in social cooperation. The CCG is characterized by superadditivity, ensuring the grand coalition formed is beneficial to all prosumers rather than acting independently or forming sub-coalitions.
- Mid-Market Rate Pricing Mechanism:
- The authors propose using a mid-market rate as the pricing model, calculated as the mean of the grid's buying and selling prices. This pricing ensures the stability of the coalition by maintaining the core of the game, preventing any prosumers from leaving the coalition. This approach is shown to be effective in existing pilot projects for P2P trading.
- Integration of Motivational Psychology Models:
- Two models from motivational psychology are incorporated: the rational-economic model, which relies on economic incentives for participation, and the positive reinforcement model that encourages continued participation through consistent economic benefits. The scheme satisfies these models, ensuring that prosumers continuously find motivation in participating in the energy trading process.
- Numerical Analysis and Case Studies:
- Simulations using real-world data on solar generation and household demand demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme. The findings indicate significant cost savings for prosumers engaged in P2P trading compared to conventional interaction with the grid, showcasing the practical benefits and sustainable participation potential of the trading model.
Implications and Future Directions
This research highlights the potential for transforming conventional energy market structures through decentralized P2P trading. The game-theoretic approach underlines the importance of coalition stability and strategic pricing mechanisms as key drivers for engaging prosumers. By incorporating motivational psychology, the scheme fosters consumer-centric design, pivotal for widespread adoption and long-term engagement.
Practically, the adoption of such trading systems can enhance grid stability, increase renewable energy penetration, and empower prosumers to play active roles in energy ecosystems. Theoretically, this approach enriches existing literature on coalition games and decentralized market mechanisms, suggesting novel avenues for integrating behavioral insights with energy trading models.
Future studies could explore enhancements to the proposed framework by considering dynamic pricing models that include additional market competitors or regulatory constraints, extending the model to include prosumers equipped with energy storage systems, and incorporating network constraints affecting energy distribution.
In summary, by evaluating the interaction between economic benefit, social cooperation, and motivational reinforcement, this paper presents a comprehensive framework for P2P energy trading, advocating for innovative market structures that align with sustainable energy practices.