Equilibria in Quantitative Concurrent Games

Abstract: Synthesis of finite-state controllers from high-level specifications in multi-agent systems can be reduced to solving multi-player concurrent games over finite graphs. The complexity of solving such games with qualitative objectives for agents, such as reaching a target set, is well understood resulting in tools with applications in robotics. In this paper, we introduce quantitative concurrent graph games, where transitions have separate costs for different agents, and each agent attempts to reach its target set while minimizing its own cost along the path. In this model, a solution to the game corresponds to a set of strategies, one per agent, that forms a Nash equilibrium. We study the problem of computing the set of all Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria, and give a comprehensive analysis of its complexity and related problems such as the price of stability and the price of anarchy. In particular, while checking the existence of a Nash equilibrium is NP-complete in general, with multiple parameters contributing to the computational hardness separately, two-player games with bounded costs on individual transitions admit a polynomial-time solution.