Price Doubling and Item Halving: Robust Revenue Guarantees for Item Pricing (1611.02442v3)

Abstract: We study approximation algorithms for revenue maximization based on static item pricing, where a seller chooses prices for various goods in the market, and then the buyers purchase utility-maximizing bundles at these given prices. We formulate two somewhat general techniques for designing good pricing algorithms for this setting: Price Doubling and Item Halving. Using these techniques, we unify many of the existing results in the item pricing literature under a common framework, as well as provide several new item pricing algorithms for approximating both revenue and social welfare. More specifically, for a variety of settings with item pricing, we show that it is possible to deterministically obtain a log-approximation for revenue and a constant-approximation for social welfare simultaneously: thus one need not sacrifice revenue if the goal is to still have decent welfare guarantees. %In addition, we provide a new black-box reduction from revenue to welfare based on item pricing, which immediately gives us new revenue-approximation algorithms (e.g., for gross substitutes valuations). The main technical contribution of this paper is a $O((\log m + \log k)^2)$-approximation algorithm for revenue maximization based on the Item Halving technique, for settings where buyers have XoS valuations, where $m$ is the number of goods and $k$ is the average supply. Surprisingly, ours is the first known item pricing algorithm with polylogarithmic approximations for such general classes of valuations, and partially resolves an important open question from the algorithmic pricing literature about the existence of item pricing algorithms with logarithmic factors for general valuations. We also use the Item Halving framework to form envy-free item pricing mechanisms for the popular setting of multi-unit markets, providing a log-approximation to revenue in this case.