Strategyproof Quota Mechanisms for Multiple Assignment Problems (1507.07064v2)

Abstract: We study the problem of allocating multiple objects to agents without transferable utilities, where each agent may receive more than one object according to a quota. Under lexicographic preferences, we characterize the set of strategyproof, non-bossy, and neutral quota mechanisms and show that under a mild Pareto efficiency condition, serial dictatorship quota mechanisms are the only mechanisms satisfying these properties. Dropping the neutrality requirement, this class of quota mechanisms further expands to sequential dictatorship quota mechanisms. We then extend quota mechanisms to randomized settings, and show that the random serial dictatorship quota mechanisms (RSDQ) are envyfree, strategyproof, and ex post efficient for any number of agents and objects and any quota system, proving that the well-studied Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) satisfies envyfreeness when preferences are lexicographic.