A largely self-contained and complete security proof for quantum key distribution (1506.08458v3)

Abstract: In this work we present a security analysis for quantum key distribution, establishing a rigorous tradeoff between various protocol and security parameters for a class of entanglement-based and prepare-and-measure protocols. The goal of this paper is twofold: 1) to review and clarify the state-of-the-art security analysis based on entropic uncertainty relations, and 2) to provide an accessible resource for researchers interested in a security analysis of quantum cryptographic protocols that takes into account finite resource effects. For this purpose we collect and clarify several arguments spread in the literature on the subject with the goal of making this treatment largely self-contained. More precisely, we focus on a class of prepare-and-measure protocols based on the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) protocol as well as a class of entanglement-based protocols similar to the Bennett-Brassard-Mermin (BBM92) protocol. We carefully formalize the different steps in these protocols, including randomization, measurement, parameter estimation, error correction and privacy amplification, allowing us to be mathematically precise throughout the security analysis. We start from an operational definition of what it means for a quantum key distribution protocol to be secure and derive simple conditions that serve as sufficient condition for secrecy and correctness. We then derive and eventually discuss tradeoff relations between the block length of the classical computation, the noise tolerance, the secret key length and the security parameters for our protocols. Our results significantly improve upon previously reported tradeoffs.