Poseidon: Mitigating Interest Flooding DDoS Attacks in Named Data Networking (1303.4823v3)

Abstract: Content-Centric Networking (CCN) is an emerging networking paradigm being considered as a possible replacement for the current IP-based host-centric Internet infrastructure. In CCN, named content becomes a first-class entity. CCN focuses on content distribution, which dominates current Internet traffic and is arguably not well served by IP. Named-Data Networking (NDN) is an example of CCN. NDN is also an active research project under the NSF Future Internet Architectures (FIA) program. FIA emphasizes security and privacy from the outset and by design. To be a viable Internet architecture, NDN must be resilient against current and emerging threats. This paper focuses on distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks; in particular we address interest flooding, an attack that exploits key architectural features of NDN. We show that an adversary with limited resources can implement such attack, having a significant impact on network performance. We then introduce Poseidon: a framework for detecting and mitigating interest flooding attacks. Finally, we report on results of extensive simulations assessing proposed countermeasure.

• The paper introduces the Poseidon framework, which detects and mitigates interest flooding in NDN by monitoring unsatisfied interests and PIT utilization.
• Simulation results show that unmitigated attacks can lower content delivery by up to 80%, highlighting a critical vulnerability in Content-Centric Networking.
• A two-phase strategy combining detection and collaborative push-back dynamically restores throughput, reinforcing NDN's viability against DDoS threats.

Analysis of "Poseidon: Mitigating Interest Flooding DDoS Attacks in Named Data Networking"

The paper "Poseidon: Mitigating Interest Flooding DDoS Attacks in Named Data Networking" presents a comprehensive paper on resilience strategies against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, specifically focusing on the vulnerabilities inherent to Named Data Networking (NDN) through interest flooding. NDN, as posited, is a promising candidate for the Future Internet Architecture (FIA) intimately tied to the principle of Content-Centric Networking (CCN), where content, not hosts, is central to the communication framework. Despite the system's potential to address limitations of the current Internet architecture, NDN is susceptible to novel attack vectors that must be scrutinized to ensure its viability at scale.

Key Contributions

The core contribution of the paper is the introduction of the Poseidon framework, designed for the detection and mitigation of interest flooding attacks in NDN. The paper identifies and elaborates on how adversaries can launch attacks with limited resources by generating fake interests that overload the Pending Interest Table (PIT), a critical component of NDN routers. The attack, known as interest flooding, can effectively exhaust the router's ability to handle legitimate interests, resulting in a substantial reduction in network throughput.

Methodology and Results

Through extensive simulation using the CCNx over NS-3 environment, the paper provides empirical evidence of the threat posed by interest flooding. Simulations on the AT&T network topology reveal that, in the absence of countermeasures, such attacks can reduce content delivery rates by up to 80%. The paper's strong numerical simulations confirm that adversaries only need to maintain a marginally higher interest generation rate than the router's capacity to satisfactorily process these requests, leading to PIT saturation.

Poseidon implements a two-phase strategy: detection and reaction. Detection leverages the monitoring of two parameters — the rate of unsatisfied interests and the PIT utilization — to identify anomalous behaviors indicative of DoS activity. The countermeasure's efficacy stems from its capability to dynamically adjust responding thresholds and utilize a collaborative push-back mechanism that propagates alerts through the network, thereby providing a distributed response to mitigate attack impacts closer to the source.

Implications and Speculations

The results demonstrated by Poseidon signify a noteworthy mitigation of interest flooding impacts, re-establishing content throughput to approximately 80% of baseline levels. This contribution is vital for the practical deployment of NDN, as it addresses a significant security challenge inherent to content-centric communication models. From a broader perspective, these findings underscore the importance of designing holistic, proactive security measures in emerging networking architectures to preclude exploitation by sophisticated DDoS techniques.

In terms of future implications, Poseidon sets a foundational precedent for adaptive, real-time security frameworks that can dynamically react to network threats. As NDN evolves and potentially adopts hardware acceleration and more intelligent network orchestration methods, extensions of Poseidon's principles could be integrated into hardware-level security protocols, real-time analytics engines, or AI-driven anomaly detection systems within NDN ecosystems.

Conclusion

The paper makes a substantive contribution to both theoretical and practical cybersecurity in CCN and NDN architectures. By articulating a robust framework for countering a critical class of DDoS attack via interest flooding, it not only enhances the resilience of emerging network designs but also lays the groundwork for further research into distributed collaborative security solutions. As interest dynamics and NDN paradigms mature, continued refinements to frameworks like Poseidon will be essential in ensuring secure and efficient communication across next-generation networks.