Security Analysis on "An Authentication Code Against Pollution Attacks in Network Coding" (1303.0557v1)

Abstract: We analyze the security of the authentication code against pollution attacks in network coding given by Oggier and Fathi and show one way to remove one very strong condition they required. Actually, we find a way to attack their authentication scheme. In their scheme, they considered that if some malicious nodes in the network collude to make pollution in the network flow or make substitution attacks to other nodes, they thought these malicious nodes must solve a system of linear equations to recover the secret parameters. Then they concluded that their scheme is an unconditional secure scheme. Actually, note that the authentication tag in the scheme of Oggier and Fathi is nearly linear on the messages, so it is very easy for any malicious node to make pollution attack in the network flow, replacing the vector of any incoming edge by linear combination of his incoming vectors whose coefficients have sum 1. And if the coalition of malicious nodes can carry out decoding of the network coding, they can easily make substitution attack to any other node even if they do not know any information of the private key of the node. Moreover, even if their scheme can work fruitfully, the condition in their scheme $H\leqslant M$ in a network can be removed, where $H$ is the sum of numbers of the incoming edges at adversaries. Under the condition $H\leqslant M$, $H$ may be large, so we need large parameter $M$ which increases the cost of computation a lot. On the other hand, the parameter $M$ can not be very large as it can not exceed the length of original messages.