Defense against SYN-Flood Denial of Service Attacks Based on Learning Automata (1208.5037v1)

Abstract: SYN-flooding attack uses the weakness available in TCP's three-way handshake process to keep it from handling legitimate requests. This attack causes the victim host to populate its backlog queue with forged TCP connections. In other words it increases Ploss (probability of loss) and Pa (buffer occupancy percentage of attack requests) and decreases Pr (buffer occupancy percentage of regular requests) in the victim host and results to decreased performance of the host. This paper proposes a self-managing approach, in which the host defends against SYN-flooding attack by dynamically tuning of its own two parameters, that is, m (maximum number of half-open connections) and h (hold time for each half-open connection). In this way, it formulates the defense problem to an optimization problem and then employs the learning automata (LA) algorithm to solve it. The simulation results show that the proposed defense strategy improves performance of the under attack system in terms of Ploss, Pa and Pr.