Using arguments for making decisions: A possibilistic logic approach (1207.4130v1)

Abstract: Humans currently use arguments for explaining choices which are already made, or for evaluating potential choices. Each potential choice has usually pros and cons of various strengths. In spite of the usefulness of arguments in a decision making process, there have been few formal proposals handling this idea if we except works by Fox and Parsons and by Bonet and Geffner. In this paper we propose a possibilistic logic framework where arguments are built from an uncertain knowledge base and a set of prioritized goals. The proposed approach can compute two kinds of decisions by distinguishing between pessimistic and optimistic attitudes. When the available, maybe uncertain, knowledge is consistent, as well as the set of prioritized goals (which have to be fulfilled as far as possible), the method for evaluating decisions on the basis of arguments agrees with the possibility theory-based approach to decision-making under uncertainty. Taking advantage of its relation with formal approaches to defeasible argumentation, the proposed framework can be generalized in case of partially inconsistent knowledge, or goal bases.