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Evolution of public cooperation on interdependent networks: The impact of biased utility functions (1201.1900v1)

Published 9 Jan 2012 in physics.soc-ph, cond-mat.stat-mech, cs.SI, and q-bio.PE

Abstract: We study the evolution of public cooperation on two interdependent networks that are connected by means of a utility function, which determines to what extent payoffs in one network influence the success of players in the other network. We find that the stronger the bias in the utility function, the higher the level of public cooperation. Yet the benefits of enhanced public cooperation on the two networks are just as biased as the utility functions themselves. While cooperation may thrive on one network, the other may still be plagued by defectors. Nevertheless, the aggregate level of cooperation on both networks is higher than the one attainable on an isolated network. This positive effect of biased utility functions is due to the suppressed feedback of individual success, which leads to a spontaneous separation of characteristic time scales of the evolutionary process on the two interdependent networks. As a result, cooperation is promoted because the aggressive invasion of defectors is more sensitive to the slowing down than the build-up of collective efforts in sizable groups.

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Authors (3)
  1. Zhen Wang (571 papers)
  2. Attila Szolnoki (125 papers)
  3. Matjaž Perc (160 papers)
Citations (336)

Summary

Evolution of Public Cooperation on Interdependent Networks: The Impact of Biased Utility Functions

The paper "Evolution of public cooperation on interdependent networks: The impact of biased utility functions" by Zhen Wang, Attila Szolnoki, and Matjaz Perc explores the dynamics of public cooperation on two interdependent networks. This paper ventures beyond the traditionally isolated network models and considers the reciprocal impact of network interaction through utility functions, providing a novel perspective on cooperative behavior in complex systems.

Study Overview

The paper examines the evolution of cooperation using two physically separated networks, labeled A and B, interconnected not by direct links but through a utility function that integrates the performance metrics of each network. Here, each player's success is not solely based on their network but is influenced by their counterpart in the other network. The paper employs a public goods game structure, where cooperators contribute resources to a communal pool, and defectors opt not to, reflecting typical scenarios in evolutionary game theory.

Model and Methodology

The networks are based on square lattices where each site represents a player, leading to a strategic interaction framed by a public goods game. The players' utility function is biased: players in network A consider the payoffs from network B more heavily, while vice versa for players in network B. The bias is quantified with a parameter α, controlling the extent to which a player's utility considers the counterpart's payoff.

Simulations indicate that the model presents an asymmetrical promotion of cooperation due to this utility configuration. Notably, a stronger bias significantly benefits cooperation in one network over the other, enhancing overall cooperative dynamics compared to traditional single-network scenarios. This finding emerges from the suppressed feedback mechanism in interdependent systems, which affects defection more adversely than the strategic buildup of cooperative clusters.

Results

Key results demonstrate that introducing interdependence via biased utility functions fosters cooperation, exceeding the cooperation levels achievable on isolated networks. For example, at α = 0.01, the simulations revealed a complete dominance of cooperators in network A, whereas network B showed a typical evolutionary outcome similar to an isolated network, underlining the asymmetric impact of the interdependent structure.

This asymmetry is further highlighted by the critical analysis of critical synergy factors (r values) for achieving all-cooperator phases, indicating that such biased utility considerations can facilitate cooperation more effectively than symmetric utility functions.

Implications and Future Directions

This paper opens pathways for rethinking how interdependent networks can be leveraged to enhance cooperative behavior, a topic highly relevant in both socio-economic and biological systems. Importantly, the findings suggest that strategic design of interdependencies and utility functions in real-world systems (e.g., economic markets, biological networks) could promote cooperative states, offering resilience against defection and competitive behavior.

The implications extend to understanding broader temporal dynamics within complex systems, where interdependencies naturally occur, such as digital infrastructures or multilayered economic policies, and wield control over cooperation tendencies and community stability.

Future research may involve exploring different network topologies, increasing the realism of interaction models, and extending these findings to more layers of interdependent relations. Additionally, examining the influence of dynamic α values in response to environmental or systemic changes could yield further insights into the adaptability and robustness of cooperative networks.

This work effectively highlights how defection dynamics and cooperative stability are critically informed by interdependent utility functions. The investigation underscores the necessity to consider inter-nodal influences in complex networks, ultimately advancing the discourse on evolutionary cooperation.