Core-Periphery Segregation in Evolving Prisoner's Dilemma Networks (1105.0515v2)

Abstract: Dense cooperative networks are an essential element of social capital for a prosperous society. These networks enable individuals to overcome collective action dilemmas by enhancing trust. In many biological and social settings, network structures evolve endogenously as agents exit relationships and build new ones. However, the process by which evolutionary dynamics lead to self-organization of dense cooperative networks has not been explored. Our large group prisoner's dilemma experiments with exit and partner choice options show that core-periphery segregation of cooperators and defectors drives the emergence of cooperation. Cooperators' Quit-for-Tat and defectors' Roving strategy lead to a highly asymmetric core and periphery structure. Densely connected to each other, cooperators successfully isolate defectors and earn larger payoffs than defectors. Our analysis of the topological characteristics of evolving networks illuminates how social capital is generated.