Secure Vehicular Communication Systems: Design and Architecture (0912.5391v1)

Abstract: Significant developments have taken place over the past few years in the area of vehicular communication (VC) systems. Now, it is well understood in the community that security and protection of private user information are a prerequisite for the deployment of the technology. This is so, precisely because the benefits of VC systems, with the mission to enhance transportation safety and efficiency, are at stake. Without the integration of strong and practical security and privacy enhancing mechanisms, VC systems could be disrupted or disabled, even by relatively unsophisticated attackers. We address this problem within the SeVeCom project, having developed a security architecture that provides a comprehensive and practical solution. We present our results in a set of two papers in this issue. In this first one, we analyze threats and types of adversaries, we identify security and privacy requirements, and we present a spectrum of mechanisms to secure VC systems. We provide a solution that can be quickly adopted and deployed. In the second paper, we present our progress towards the implementation of our architecture and results on the performance of the secure VC system, along with a discussion of upcoming research challenges and our related current results.

• The paper presents an adversary model classification that distinguishes between passive and active threats to assess risks precisely.
• The paper details a robust architecture employing cryptographic primitives and hardware security modules to secure V2V and V2I communications.
• The paper introduces an efficient credential management and revocation mechanism that enhances anonymity while ensuring accountability in vehicle networks.

Secure Vehicular Communication Systems: Design and Architecture

The paper "Secure Vehicular Communication Systems: Design and Architecture" by Papadimitratos et al. presents a comprehensive framework aimed at addressing the security and privacy challenges in vehicular communication (VC) systems. The authors provide a detailed investigation into the threats and adversarial models pertinent to VC systems, and propose a robust architecture to mitigate these concerns.

Key Contributions and Findings

1. Adversary Models and Threats: The paper classifies adversaries as either passive or active, with further distinctions between internal and external threat actors. The model anticipates adversaries exploiting VC protocols to either gather information or disrupt the system. Active threats include modifying messages or replay attacks, while passive threats involve eavesdropping.
2. Security and Privacy Requirements: The authors delineate fundamental requirements such as message authentication, non-repudiation, entity authentication, access control, confidentiality, accountability, and privacy protection. These requirements guide the development of protocols aimed at safeguarding vehicle communications.
3. Baseline Architecture: The architecture leverages cryptographic primitives to secure vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications. The proposed system integrates identity and credential management with hardware security modules (HSMs) to enhance message security and user privacy.
4. Credential Management and Key Distribution: The architecture distinguishes between long-term and short-term vehicle identifications. Vehicles use pseudonyms, supported by short-term public key certificates, to maintain anonymity and mitigate tracking threats while allowing for secure communications.
5. Hardware Security Module (HSM): The HSM is tasked with holding sensitive cryptographic keys and conducting operations that require these keys. It forms the trusted computing base of the system, ensuring that keys are not exposed even in the event of physical device tampering.
6. Revocation and Misbehavior Handling: The system includes mechanisms for Certificate Revocation List (CRL) distribution and localized node eviction processes, such as Misbehavior Detection System (MDS) and Local Eviction of Attackers by Voting Evaluators (LEAVE). This helps to maintain system integrity by excluding misbehaving or compromised nodes.

Implications and Future Directions

The architecture proposed satisfies both practical security requirements and privacy concerns, laying the groundwork for secure deployments of VC systems. By effectively addressing the vulnerabilities inherent to vehicular networks, this architecture supports the creation of reliable communication channels over which safety and efficiency-driven applications can operate.

The emphasis on cryptographic tools suggests that the system can adapt to future advances in cryptography and hardware. Additionally, the integration with existing VC protocols points to opportunities for collaborative efforts among vehicle manufacturers, network administrators, and governmental bodies.

Future work could focus on optimizing the performance of the secure VC systems in real-world conditions, exploring adaptations for diverse regulatory environments, and expanding the scope to accommodate evolving applications in connected and automated vehicles. The progression of sensor technologies and communication standards will likely drive the need for ongoing innovation in secure vehicular architectures, ensuring robust performance and user trust in transport networks.